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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Barton was the victim of an exceptionally violent crime.

In that case,

three individuals were charged with multiple felonies each for allegedly having attacked
Mr. Barton.
As the cases against Mr. Barton's attackers proceeded, Mr. Barton found himself
in discussions with the lawyer of one of his attackers. That lawyer offered Mr. Barton
money in exchange for Mr. Barton's promise to testify favorably for the lawyer's client.
Although Mr. Barton denies that he ever had the intent to testify falsely, it is undisputed
that he accepted the lawyer's offer. The lawyer then pressured Mr. Barton to recruit
another witness to testify falsely.

After resisting initially, Mr. Barton eventually

acquiesced to that request as well.
As it turns out, the lawyer was working for the police.

He wanted to "burn"

Mr. Barton in order to discredit him so that he could not testify against the lawyer's
client. Thus, Mr. Barton wound up being charged with one count of soliciting perjury (for
his actions in recruiting the other witness to testify falsely), and one count of conspiring
(with the other witness) to commit perjury.
Mr. Barton exercised his right to a jury trial and, at trial, made it clear that he
sought to assert two defenses:

(1) innocence (based on lack of intent); and (2)

entrapment. The district court, however, refused to instruct the jury on the defense of
entrapment.

Thus, Mr. Barton was only able to proceed on his innocence (lack of

intent) theory and, after more than eleven hours of deliberations, although the jury hung
on the conspiracy charge, it found him guilty of solicitation.

1

Mr. Barton timely appealed. On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred in
refusing his requested instruction on the defense of entrapment. In its most basic form,
Mr. Barton's argument is that, because there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable
juror to have found each of the elements of entrapment, it was legal error for the district
court to have denied his request for an entrapment instruction. (See Appellant's Brief,
pp.22-30.)
In response, the State argues that the district court correctly denied Mr. Barton's
request for an entrapment instruction. The State contends that there is no reasonable
view of the evidence that would support a finding of two of the three elements of the
defense of entrapment-the requirement that the idea for the crime came from a state
agent and the requirement that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime
(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-13)-and that, even if sufficient evidence was present,
Mr. Barton could not avail himself of the entrapment defense unless or until he
otherwise admitted his guilt (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-17).
The present Reply Brief is necessary to point out the errors in each of the State's
arguments.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in
Mr. Barton's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not restated herein.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in refusing Mr. Barton's requested jury instruction on the
defense of entrapment?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Refusing To Instruct The JUry On The Defense Of
Entrapment

A.

Introduction
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Barton asserted that the general standard for giving a

jury instruction requested by the defendant is whether a reasonable view of the
evidence supports the defense theory at issue in that instruction, and that this general
standard is the standard that has traditionally been applied to requests for jury
instructions on the defense of entrapment in Idaho.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.22-24.)

Mr. Barton then went on to argue that this standard was satisfied with regard to his
request for an entrapment instruction in this case, in that there was ample evidence
from which reasonable jurors could have found that he was entrapped.

(Appellant's

Brief, pp.24-30.) In response, the State contends that there is no reasonable view of
the evidence that would support a finding of two of the three elements of the defense of
entrapment-the requirement that the idea for the crime came from a state agent and
the requirement that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-13.)
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Barton also anticipated that the State would attempt
to argue that the district court's decision to refuse his requested jury instruction was
correct under the theory that criminal defendants are precluded from asserting an
entrapment defense unless they also admit their guilt (under the theory that these
alternative defenses are too inconsistent to present to the same jury). In anticipation of
this argument, Mr. Barton asserted in his opening brief that: (1) the entrapment defense
is not so limited in Idaho; (2) to the extent that the entrapment defense is so limited, the
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case that so holds is unjust and unwise and should now be overruled; and (3) even if
the entrapment defense is so limited in Idaho, and will continue to be so limited going
forward, the reality is that Mr. Barton's proffered "innocence" and "entrapment" defenses
in this case were not actually inconsistent under the facts and circumstances of this
case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.30-44.) As anticipated, in response, that State argues that
Idaho law clearly precluded Mr. Barton from offering alternative defense theories, and
that Mr. Barton has failed to show that Idaho law should now be overruled in this regard.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.13-17.)
For the reasons set forth in detail below, none of the State's arguments have
merit.

B.

Mr. Barton Was Entitled To The Requested Entrapment Instruction Because A
Reasonable View Of The Evidence Supports Such A Theory Of Defense
As was explained in Mr. Barton's Appellant's Brief (p.22), there are three

elements to the defense of entrapment under Idaho law: (1) "[t]he idea for committing
the crime came from an agent of the state and not from the defendant;" (2) "[t]he state
agent[ ] then persuaded" the defendant to commit the crime (as opposed to merely
providing an opportunity for the defendant to commit the crime); and (3) "[t]he defendant
was not ready and willing," i.e., predisposed, "to commit the crime" in the absence of
"the actions of the state agent[]." I.C.J.I. 1513; see also State v. Henry, 138 Idaho 364,
367 (Ct. App. 2003) (implicitly holding that I.C.J.I. 1513 properly states the law of
entrapment).
It is the State's contention that the district court was correct to have declined
Mr. Barton's request for an entrapment instruction because "there was no evidence" of
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two the above three elements. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-13.) Specifically, the State
contends that there was no evidence that Lynn Dunlap was an agent of the State, or
that Mr. Barton was not predisposed to commit the crime of solicitation of perjury.

1.

There Was Ample Evidence From Which A Reasonable Juror Could Have
Concluded That Lynn Dunlap Was A State Agent

The State contends that there is no evidence that Lynn Dunlap, the attorney who
Mr. Barton contends entrapped him, was an agent of the State. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.8-10.) This claim by the State (which is largely unsupported by authority),1 turns on
three faulty premises: (1) an individual can only be a state agent if he was approached
by the State (as opposed to him approaching the State); (2) Mr. Dunlap's motive
(benefitting his client) and the State's motive (prosecuting Mr. Barton) were mutually
exclusive, such that it cannot be said the Mr. Dunlap operated with a "prosecution
motive"; and (3) providing Mr. Dunlap with the means to proceed with his plan to "burn"
Mr. Barton, and "cloth[ing] Mr. Dunlap with" immunity from prosecution "hardly rendered
him [Mr. Dunlap] a state agent." (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.)
As is discussed in detail below, State's argument is frivolous because the
premises upon which it is apparently based are inconsistent with controlling law, the
facts of this case, and logic.

The State cites only one case-Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B. V., 148 Idaho
89, 109 (2009)-in support of its argument, and even this case is cited solely for the
unremarkable proposition that "[g]enerally an agent is a person authorized by a principal
to take actions on behalf of that principal." (Respondent's Brief, p.8.)
1
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a)

The State Has No Basis To Suggest That An Informant Can Only
Be A State Agent If The State Is The Party That Initiates The
Relationship

Throughout its argument concerning the purported lack of proof that Mr. Dunlap
was an agent of the State in this case, the State suggests that no informant can ever be
an agent of the State unless the State is the party that initiates the agency relationship.
This suggestion has no basis in law or logic.
First, the State cites no authority in support of its claim that one cannot be a state
agent if he is the one who initiates contact with the police (rather than the police
initiating contact with him). Accordingly, this argument is waived. See State v. Zichko,
129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority
or argument is lacking .... "); I.A.R. 35(b)(6).2
More importantly though, the State's suggestion is substantively meritless. By
the State's reasoning, a confidential informant would not be a state agent if, facing
criminal charges of his own, he approached the police and offered to "work off" his
charges by becoming a confidential informant; under the State's theory that confidential
informant would only be the State's agent if the police approached the informant. This
contention is illogical. Moreover, in State v. Currington, 113 Idaho 538 (Ct. App. 1987),
the Court of Appeals made it clear that this is not the law in Idaho. In Currington, the

2 Although Zichko dealt with an appellant's failure to provide authority or argument, it
actually spoke in broader terms, couching its holding in terms of "a party" who fails to
provide authority or argument. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263 (emphasis added). And,
indeed, this broader language makes infinite sense since the holding of Zichko was
based on the appellant's failure to comply with I.A.R. 35, which requires not only that
the appellant's brief "contain the contentions of the appellant ... , the reasons therefor,
with citations to the authorities, citations and parts of the transcript and record relied
upon," I.A.R. 35(a)(6), but also that the respondent's brief contain such things. I.A.R.
35(b)(6).
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Court of Appeals held that where an acquaintance of the defendant approached the
authorities about threats allegedly made by the defendant, and was provided with the
equipment needed to surreptitiously record phone conversations with the defendant, he
was acting as a state agent when he recorded a conversation with the defendant. Id. at
545. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held as follows:
Although Cochran allegedly approached the police for protection and was
not paid for his services, he was acting pursuant to instructions from an
employee of the prosecuting attorney's office when he made the
recording. Further, he utilized equipment provided by that office and,
according to his own testimony, he promptly returned the tape after
making the recordings. . .. Under these circumstances, we do not find the
lack of monetary compensation particularly significant. We hold that when
making the recording, Cochran was acting as an agent whose acts are
attributable to the state.

Further, in State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512 (Ct. App. 1994), the Court of Appeals
identified the standard for determining whether a private citizen acts as an agent of the
state4 :
The government must be involved either directly as a participant or
indirectly as an encourager of the private citizen's actions in order to bring
those actions within the purview of the fourth amendment. In analyzing
whether the person conducting the search is acting as a government
agent, two critical factors must be considered: (1) government knowledge
and acquiescence, and (2) the private party's intent in making the search.

3 In Currington, the defendant-appellant had alleged a Sixth Amendment (right to
counsel) violation based on the informant's recording of the phone call in question.
Thus, it was in this context that the Court of Appeals held that the informant was a state
agent. Although the present case obviously does not involve a Sixth Amendment
challenge, there is no principled reason why the Court of Appeals' "state agent" analysis
in Currington should not control in this case.
4 In Kopsa, the Court of Appeals examined the "state agent" question in the context of
an alleged Fourth Amendment (search) violation; however, there is no reason why its
analysis should be limited to that context.
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Id. at 517. Conspicuously absent from this analysis is any inquiry into which party-the

informant or the police-initiated the relationship. Accordingly, Mr. Barton submits that
the fact that Mr. Dunlap was the one who approached the police is wholly irrelevant to
the question of whether he was a state agent.

b)

The State Has No Basis To Argue That Mr. Dunlap's Underlying
Motive Of Aiding His Client Somehow Makes It Impossible For Him
To Have Been A State Agent When He Worked With Police To
"Burn" Mr. Barton

The State also argues that Mr. Dunlap's motive (benefitting his client) and the
State's motive (prosecuting Mr. Barton) were mutually exclusive, such that it cannot be
said the Mr. Dunlap operated with a "prosecution motive." This argument, however, is
illogical and inconsistent with the law.
Initially, it should be observed that generating evidence to further a criminal
prosecution is not so much a "motive" as an intent or objective. An individual's motive
for generating evidence for a criminal prosecution-whether it be a desire for personal
gain (the typical confidential informant scenario); a benefit to a client (this case) or other
third party; revenge or racial animus; the hope for prestige, popularity, or career
advancement; or simply a genuine desire to protect the public-is irrelevant.

The

question is whether the private party attempted to generate the evidence with the intent
or objective of having it used in a criminal prosecution. See Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517;
Currington, 113 Idaho at 545. And, in this case, because one of Mr. Dunlap's primary

motives was to benefit his client, and one way to benefit his client was by damaging the
credibility of his client's victim, he certainly attempted to generate evidence to support a
criminal case against Mr. Barton:
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I felt by burning Mr. Barton, he would become worthless as a witness to
the state. Same thing with Ms. Souza. By putting on the record that they
had solicited bribes or accepted funds, their credibility at trial relative to my
client [Mr. Taylor] would be minimal; and I anticipated in the long run
Mr. Taylor would be exonerated of the charges, simply because this is
what-[these are] the type of people who are testifying against him,
people would solicit bribes.
(Tr., p.333, Ls.13-23; see also Respondent's Brief, p.8 (State conceding that "it is true
that Mr. Dunlap's motive was to benefit his client in the criminal case,,). 5 Thus, he acted
with the intent to generate evidence against Mr. Barton such that his motive of aiding his
client, and his intent and objective of supporting a criminal prosecution against
Mr. Barton, were not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, because Mr. Dunlap acted with
the intent of generating evidence to be used against Mr. Barton in a criminal
prosecution, this prong of the test for determining whether he was a state agent was
satisfied.

c)

The State's Ultimate Conclusion That There Is "No Evidence" Of
Mr. Dunlap Being A State Agent Is Inconsistent With The Facts Of
This Case And The Applicable Law

The State's third argument is that by providing Mr. Dunlap with the means to
proceed with his plan to "burn" Mr. Barton, and "cloth[ing] Mr. Dunlap with" immunity
from prosecution, the State "hardly rendered him [Mr. Dunlap] a state agent."

5 Mr. Dunlap also claims to have had society's interest at heart. He claims that by going
to the police, he would fulfill what he thought was "the ethical obligation[ ] of an attorney,
of any upright citizen, of any honest citizen, and that is, when you see a crime about to
be committed, you notify law enforcement about it, and you make certain that whoever's
going to perpetrate that crime is brought to justice." (Tr., p.330, L.24 - p.331, L.9.) He
went on to claim: "I think that's my job as an attorney, as a human being; and that's
what I did as a citizen." (Tr., p.331, Ls.7-9.)
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(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.)

This argument fails as well, as it is based on an

incomplete view of the facts, and an apparent misapprehension of the applicable law.
Initially, it should be noted that the State's contention rests on the faulty premise
that "[t]he only evidence of police involvement in the crime was that they recorded the
conversations between Mr. Dunlap and Barton and provided the money used as sown
payments." (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) However, the truth is that the police did more
than record conversations and provide "buy" money. They "instructed" Mr. Dunlap set
up the initial meeting with Mr. Barton (Tr., p.497, Ls.13-16; accord Tr., p.498, Ls.6-11);
they "directed" or "instruct[ed]" him to give the "buy" money to Mr. Barton (Tr., p.501,
L.11 - p.502, L.10); and they provided Mr. Dunlap with the equipment, expertise, and
manpower necessary to record his conversations with Mr. Barton (Tr., p.219, L. 7 p.220, L.5 (Mr. Dunlap explaining that local law enforcement supplied the surveillance
equipment used in this case, and even came to his office to set it up), p.497, Ls.22-25
(Det. Clements testifying that the police operated the video camera used to record the
meetings between Mr. Dunlap and Mr. Barton).
More importantly though, the standard (under the first prong discussed in Kopsa)
is simply whether Mr. Dunlap acted with "government knowledge and acquiescence."
Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517. Thus, even if this Court were to focus only on the narrow set

of facts discussed by the State, it is inescapable that Mr. Dunlap was, in fact a state
agent.
And finally, the question before this Court is not whether Mr. Barton can prove to
this Court's satisfaction that he acted with "government knowledge and acquiescence,"
but rather, whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable juror eQuId
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have reached that conclusion.

This is relatively low standard.

And, as noted, the

undisputed evidence reveals that Mr. Dunlap coordinated with, and took direction from,
the police, and he also relied on police equipment, expertise and manpower. At a bare
minimum, this evidence is sufficient for a reasonable juror to reach the conclusion that
the government had knowledge of, and acquiesced in, Mr. Dunlap's actions.

d)

Conclusion: There Is Ample Evidence From Which A Reasonable
Juror Could Have Concluded That Mr. Dunlap Was An Agent Of
The State

In light of the applicable legal standards, Mr. Dunlap's objective of generating
evidence to support a criminal case against Mr. Barton, and Mr. Dunlap's close working
relationship with the police in generating that evidence, Mr. Barton submits that there is
ample evidence from which a juror could reasonably have concluded that Mr. Dunlap
was an agent of the State.

2.

There Was Ample Evidence From Which A Reasonable Juror Could Have
Concluded That Mr. Barton Was Not Predisposed To Commit The Crime
Of Solicitation Of Perjury

The State also contends that "there was no evidence presented at trial that
Barton was not inclined to solicit Ms. Souza-Pena to perjure herself." (Respondent's
Brief, p.10.) It then goes on to assert that, because of this, the district court was correct
to have denied Mr. Barton's request for a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.1 0-12.)
Rather than highlighting any lack of evidence to support Mr. Barton's position,
however, the State highlights the evidence that it says cuts against Mr. Barton's ultimate
conclusion. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.1 0-12.) Thus, the State seeks to have this
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Court weigh the competing evidence, conclude as a factual matter that Mr. Barton was
inclined to solicit Ms. Souza-Pen a's perjury, and, on that basis, conclude that the district
court was correct to have failed to give an entrapment instruction. However, this would
not be the correct legal analysis. Appellate courts are not fact-finders. State v. Zavala,
134 Idaho 532, 535-36 (Ct. App. 2000). Moreover, as noted, the relevant question for
this Court is simply whether there is a "reasonable view of the evidence" that would
support the conclusion that Mr. Barton was not predisposed to solicit perjury. And in
this case there is. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.28-30 (highlighting relevant evidence).)
In furtherance of its attempt to have this Court weigh the evidence and conclude
that Mr. Barton was predisposed to commit the crime of solicitation of perjury, the State
relies heavily on Kopsa, supra. The State discusses the facts of that case (a police
officer, posing as an airline employee, used a ruse to convince the defendant to deliver
drugs to the undercover officer), characterizes the Court of Appeals' Opinion as holding
that the ruse "was a legitimate method of determining whether Kapsa knew what was in
the package, and therefore merely provided her with the opportunity to commit the
crime," and suggests that Kopsa would allow this Court to hold, as a matter of law, that
Mr. Barton was predisposed to solicit perjury.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.)

The

State's reliance on Kopsa in this regard is misplaced, however, because in Kopsa, the
question was whether the district court had erred in denying a motion to dismiss based
on entrapment. See Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 519-20. Presumably, in order to have held
that the district court erred in failing to dismiss a criminal action for entrapment, there
would have to be no genuine question as to any of the elements of the entrapment
defense having been present; the standard would not have been whether there was a
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"reasonable view of the evidence" that would support a finding of entrapment, as is the
standard here. As such, Kopsa is best understood as standing for the proposition that,
under the facts of that case, there was simply a question of material fact as to whether
the defendant was predisposed to commit the charged offense and, as such, the matter
had to be submitted to the jury. Accordingly, it does not further the State's argument in
this case.
The bottom line is that because the evidence was in dispute, and a reasonable
juror could have gone either way on the question of whether Mr. Barton was
predisposed to solicit perjury in this case, the matter should have been put to the jury
through a jury instruction on the entrapment defense. The district court's failure to give
that instruction, therefore, was error.

C.

The Fact That Mr. Barton Asserted His Innocence In This Case Should Have
Been No Barrier To Presentation Of An Entrapment Theory Of Defense
As noted, in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Barton anticipated that the State would

attempt to argue that the district court's decision to refuse his requested jury instruction
on the defense of entrapment was correct under the theory that criminal defendants are
precluded from asserting an entrapment defense unless they also admit their guilt
(under the theory that these alternative defenses are too inconsistent to present to the
same jury). In anticipation of this argument, Mr. Barton asserted in his opening brief
that: (1) the entrapment defense is not so limited in Idaho; (2) to the extent that the
entrapment defense is so limited, the case that so holds is unjust and unwise and
should now be overruled; and (3) even if the entrapment defense is so limited in Idaho,
and will continue to be so limited going forward, the reality is that Mr. Barton's proffered
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"innocence" and "entrapment" defenses in this case were not actually inconsistent under
the facts and circumstances of this case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.30-44.)
As expected, in response, that State argues that Idaho law clearly precluded
Mr. Barton from offering alternative defense theories, and that Mr. Barton has failed to
show that Idaho law should now be overruled in this regard.
pp.13-17.)

(Respondent's Brief,

While the State's argument in this regard is largely unremarkable and is

adequately rebutted by the contents of Mr. Barton's opening brief, one theme appearing
in the State's Respondent's Brief warrants further discussion.
Of concern is the State's suggestion that a theory of innocence based on a lack
of criminal intent is fatally inconsistent with a theory of innocence based on entrapment.
The State asserts that "[h]aving criminal intent placed there by the government and not
having criminal intent at all are mutually exclusive. It would be highly ironic in a perjury
trial to allow Barton to testify to both. For the defense to argue entrapment in this case,
it would necessarily have to argue that the jury must reject Barton's testimony as being
untruthfuL"

(Respondent's Brief, p.14.)

Further, and along similar lines, the State

argues that, from a policy perspective, it makes sense to preclude a defendant claiming
innocence from obtaining an entrapment defense because:
"To allow a defendant to testify as to two defenses that cannot both be
true is equivalent to sanctioning a defendant's perjury." State v. Soule,
811 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Ariz. 1991) (emphasis original).
When the
defendant testifies he did not commit the offense, entrapment can be
found only if the defendant is lying. !Q.. at 1074. Defense counsel arguing
a theory that implies the defendant lied about his actions of his intent
creates a risk of jury confusion. Id. at 1073.
(Respondent's Brief, p.16.)
The State's concerns are without merit. Even if the State is correct to assert that
an innocence defense based on lack of intent is generally inconsistent with an
15

entrapment defense, this would not mean that instructing the jury on the entrapment
defense when the defendant maintains his innocence based on lack of intent creates
any sort of inconsistency.

In other words, even if it would be inconsistent for a

defendant to offer alternate theories to the jury through his own testimony and/or the
arguments of his counsel, that does not mean that it is inconsistent to instruct the jury
on alternate theories.
There is no reason why a defendant-through his own testimony and through the
arguments of his counsel-cannot provide the jury with one set of facts (e.g., innocence
based on lack of intent), but, based its evaluation of the defendant's testimony and all of
the other evidence in the case, have the jury find a different set of facts (e.g., the
defendant's guilt or his innocence based on a different theory, such as entrapment).
That is because the jury is "free to believe all, part, or none of the defendant's testimony
.... " Commonwealth v. McGuire, 488 A.2d 1144, 1150-51 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). As

was discussed in Mr. Barton's Appellant's Brief (pp.41-42), concerns such as those
proffered by the State in this case are best labeled "illusory." In light of this (as well as
the reasons set forth in Mr. Barton's Appellant's Brief), Mr. Barton submits that the fact
that he maintained his innocence of the charged offenses was no barrier to submission
of an entrapment instruction to the jury.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, as well as in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Barton
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and sentence and remand his
case to the district court for a new trial on the solicitation charge.
DATED this

4th

day of April, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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